(Executive Summary)

September 15^th, 2026

The first-ever South Korea–Central Asia summit, bringing together President Lee Jae Myung and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Seoul on September 16, marks a significant upgrade in South Korea’s relations with the region. While the Korea–Central Asia Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007, this is the first time the mechanism has been elevated to the level of heads of state. The summit reflects Seoul’s growing interest in Central Asia as a source of critical minerals, energy resources and new markets for South Korean companies. Yet it may also signal a deeper transformation of South Korea’s Eurasian strategy: Central Asia is increasingly occupying part of the geopolitical and economic space previously dominated by Russia.

Under President Moon Jae-in’s New Northern Policy, Russia was the central pillar of Seoul’s Eurasian ambitions. Major projects focused on the Russian Far East, the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route, energy, shipbuilding and potential trilateral economic projects involving Russia and both Koreas. Central Asia was important, but largely remained a secondary component of this strategy. Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, South Korea’s participation in sanctions against Moscow and the subsequent expansion of Russia–North Korea cooperation, much of this agenda was effectively frozen.

The shift toward Central Asia did not begin with Lee Jae Myung. In 2024, conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol launched the K-Silk Road Cooperation Initiative and proposed the first Korea–Central Asia summit. South Korean policy documents at the time explicitly pointed to the need to reorganize Seoul’s Eurasian approach, which had previously been heavily centered on Russia, in response to the changed geopolitical environment. Lee, despite his political differences with Yoon, has retained this initiative and incorporated it into his own revived New Northern Policy. The result is an unusual degree of foreign-policy continuity across three administrations: Moon developed the broader Eurasian concept, Yoon created a dedicated Central Asian strategy, and Lee is now bringing the two together.

Central Asia cannot replace Russia entirely. It cannot provide an equivalent to Russia’s geographic position, the Russian Far East, the Trans-Siberian Railway or the Northern Sea Route, nor can it match Moscow’s influence over North Korea. It can, however, compensate for part of what Seoul has lost. Central Asian states offer critical minerals and energy resources, expanding markets for Korean companies and major opportunities in infrastructure, transportation, digital technology, AI and industrial development. Crucially, cooperation with them does not carry the sanctions risks that now complicate major South Korean projects involving Russia. The large ethnic Korea (Koryo-saram) community provides an additional human and cultural bridge between South Korea and the region.

Central Asia could also acquire a secondary role in Seoul’s North Korea policy. Under Yoon, South Korea sought Central Asian support for denuclearization and international pressure on Pyongyang and Russia–North Korea military cooperation. Under Lee, the same network could potentially be used for a different purpose: as an additional channel for encouraging dialogue with Pyongyang. Central Asian states have limited leverage over North Korea, but their ties with Moscow, historical contacts with Pyongyang and simultaneously strong relations with Seoul could make them useful intermediaries, communication channels or neutral diplomatic venues.

The emerging strategy should therefore be understood not as an attempt to replace Russia with Central Asia, but as an effort to operate without Russia for as long as the Russian track remains frozen. Seoul is unlikely to abandon Russia permanently: geography, logistics and Russia’s importance to the Korean Peninsula make that unrealistic. At the same time, South Korea has little reason to postpone its Eurasian ambitions until relations with Moscow improve.

If the current trend continues, the long-term consequence may extend beyond the present crisis in Russia–South Korea relations. Even if ties with Moscow eventually normalize, Seoul may return to Russia within a fundamentally different Eurasian architecture — one in which Russia remains a major partner, but is no longer the unquestioned center of South Korea’s northern strategy.

Oleg Kiryanov

※ The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Asia Risk Research Center.

Editor's note: This is an abridged English summary of an article originally published in Russian. The full Russian version is available on the Asia Risk Research Center website.